By the end of 1931 the center of gravity of
German political life was rapidly moving away from the Reichstag (the
German parliament) and chancellery to the streets, where the Nazis and their
opponents came into frequent collision. Quasi-military formations and
uniforms were back in fashion in the early 1930s. The Nazis had enrolled
over 400,000 men in the SA, a huge private army which protected party
meetings and intimidated political opponents. The Stahlhelm (largest
veterans' organization) representing the more conservative nationalities,
had also become a considerable political force.
On the left Reichsbanner Schwarz-Rot-Gold, trade unions and workers'
athletic clubs formed the Eiserne republikanische Front zur Abwehr des
Faschismus (Iron Republican Front for the Defeat of Fascism) in December
1931. Against this back-cloth of mounting tension and violence, which the
Reichstag was powerless to stop, the presidency emerged as the stable point
in a fluid political situation. Effective power resided partly in the
presidential palace, partly on the streets, but less and less in the
Reichstag or in the chancellery.
I. Presidential Election of 1932
The crucial importance of the presidency was emphasized in the spring of
1932, when Hindenburg's term of office expired. The old man, now in a state
of mental and physical decline, wanted to retire to Neudeck, his country
estate, to end his days in peace. Brüning insisted that he remain at the
head of affairs, firmly convince that Hindenburg was the only alternative to
Hitler. Naturally Brüning wished to avoid the excitement of a presidential
election at a time of nationalist ferment when the Nazi vote was increasing
at every Land election, so he tried to obtain the agreement oft he parties
to a constitutional amendment extending Hindenburg's term of office to 1934.
Neither Hitler nor Hugenberg would agree to this expedient, and reluctantly
Hindenburg agreed to stand for re-election. That the Socialists and Center
supported him, while the German Nationalists ran a candidate against him,
greatly upset the old man, whose sympathies lay completely on the right.
After some initial hesitation Hitler agreed to stand. On the eve of the
election he hastily assumed German citizenship by accepting the post of
Regierungsrat (government advisor) in the little Nazi-controlled Land of
Brunswick. A bitter and frenzied campaign ensued, marked by further street
violence. In effect it was a plebiscite for or against National Socialism, a
contest between the power of the streets and the magic of an old warrior's
name backed by the power of the Reichswehr. On the second ballot in April
1932 Hindenburg received 19,359,000 votes, Hitler 13,418,000, and the
Communist Thälmann, 3,706,000.
Though defeated, the Nazis had won a great moral victory. Since 1930 their
vote had nearly doubled, and between the first and second ballots Hitler
succeeded in capturing an extra two million votes. Nor had those republicans
who reluctantly supported Hindenburg, as the only alternative to a reign of
lawlessness under Hitler, much cause for congratulation. They had no
guarantee that the weary octogenarian would respect the spirit of the
constitution or display sound judgement in affairs of state. Within a matter
of weeks there was proof of his lack of political insight when he dispensed
with the services of his faithful and devoted chancellor who had worked
zealously to secure his re-election.
The resignation of Brüning in May was very largely the work of Schleicher.
In the course of 1931 Schleicher changed his mind about Brüning, once it was
clear that the latter had failed to rally moderate opinion in defense of the
presidential system. As radical nationalism grew in strength, Schleicher
concluded that the only certain way of avoiding a Nazi uprising, likely to
strain the loyalties of the Reichswehr, was to come to terms with
Hitler and include him in a presidential cabinet under a more right-wing
chancellor. Immediately after the election Brüning had yielded to pressure
from several Länder, notably Prussia, and banned the SA and SS as a serious
danger to state security. Schleicher was alarmed, not out of any respect for
these ill-disciplined rowdies, but simply because he feared the reaction of
the right wing to a ban on a nationalist organization. The time had come, he
decided, to end "the drift to the left" and appoint a new chancellor who
would show no favour to Socialists but would do his best to prepare the
ground for a rapprochement with Hitler.
Looking back over the years, it is only too apparent that Schleicher was a
vain and self-confident intriguer, who grossly underestimated the nature of
the Nazi party, lightly assuming that it was a healthy nationalist movement
which he could tame and exploit by adroit political manipulation. The
general was digging his own grave as he intrigued first against Groener,
whom he forced to reign, and then against Brüning. The president was already
out of sympathy with Brüning's policies and lent a ready ear tot he advice
of Schleicher, eagerly reinforced by his son Oskar von Hindenburg. Early in
May 1932 Schleicher overcame the president's lingering doubts by informing
him that Hitler had now agreed not to oppose a new chancellor, on condition
that the ban on SA and SS was lifted and new elections were ordered.
The scene was set for Brüning's dismissal. Ironically enough, the chancellor
was confident that the tide was turning at last, both at home and abroad.
Well aware that his deflationary policies had failed to cure unemployment,
now topping the six million mark, he was preparing cautiously to reflate the
economy and had drafted a program of public works, including proposals for
the break-up of some inefficient East Prussian estates and the resettlement
of 600,000 unemployed on them. Landowning circles got wind of this and their
spokesman, Oldenburg-Januschau, visited Hindenburg at Neudeck and easily
persuaded the disgruntled president that Brüning was an "agrarian bolshevik"
bent on socializing agriculture. When Brüning appeared with new emergency
decrees the old man refused to sign, and insisted on the formation of a more
right-wing cabinet. Brüning was deeply offended by Hindenburg's ingratitude
when the government was allegedly "only a hundred meters from the goal,"
with reparations and disarmament likely to be resolved in Germany's favor.
Characteristically, he made only a half-hearted attempt to justify himself,
meekly tendering his resignation and that of his cabinet, which was at once
accepted.
The fall of Brüning was a turning-point in these critical years. His
dependence on Hindenburg hardly compensated for his lack of tactical ability
and mass appeal. And though his deflationary policies contributed materially
tot he abolition of reparations, they did so only by deepening the domestic
crisis. Still, Brüning was a man of integrity and a deeply patriotic German
who won the respect of foreign statesmen. And once he had departed the
prospects for the survival of even a mildly authoritarian regime suddenly
looked much bleaker.
The eight months which came between the resignation of Brüning and the
appointment of Hitler as chancellor were full of feverish political activity
and complex political maneuvering. There could be no clearer sign of the
bankruptcy of the political system than the appointment of Franz von Papen
as chancellor. A charming and accomplished socialite and close friend of
Schleicher, Papen was a Westphalian aristocrat with industrial connections,
a former general-staff officer in the old Prussian army, a Catholic with
authoritarian views, a crafty intriguer certainly, but a man of little
political insight or stature.
A storm of disapproval greeted his government of "national concentration,"
which represented the interests of business men and landowners so blatantly
that contemporaries dubbed it "the cabinet of barons." The left was
automatically against Papen. The center bitterly hostile to the man who had
ousted Brüning. Event he nationalists were annoyed because Papen had been
preferred to Hugenberg. And much to his surprise Schleicher discovered that
Hitler was not a man of his word. Despite Hitler's promise, the Nazis
attacked Papen as they had attacked Brüning before him. Clearly there was no
hope of the Reichstag's "tolerating" Papen as it "tolerated" Brüning. So
fresh elections were ordered at once and, in accordance with Schleicher's
promise to Hitler, the ban on the SA was lifted, a step which resulted in a
new wave of street violence sweeping through Germany in the high summer of
1932.
II. The Prussian Coup
To curry favor with the right wing before going to the polls, and also to
strengthen the government's hand vis-a-vis Hitler by securing control of the
police in the largest German state, Schleicher and Papen decided on a coup
d'état to unseat the Prussian government. For years the extreme right had
resented the Socialist-Center government which had made Prussia a bulwark of
the Weimar system. In April 1932 local elections destroyed the "red-black"
majority, but as Nazis, Communists and Nationalists were not likely to reach
agreement, the Braun-Severing government remained in office on a caretaker
basis.
On 20 July 1932 Papen declared a state of emergency in Prussia, appointed
himself Reichskommissar, and dismissed the Prussian ministers on the grounds
that they had favored the Communists and had failed to prevent fresh street
violence (for which Papen's raising of the ban on the SA was to blame).
Neither Centrists nor Socialists were prepared to resist Papen. The
Socialists acquiesced in the situation, as their predecessors had done when
Stresemann struck at Saxony in 1923. One police captain and five men
sufficed to remove Socialist ministers from office in the most
industrialized and powerful Land in Germany.
Of course they made out a compelling case for inaction. Resistance would
have led to useless bloodshed because the Reichswehr, the Stahlhelm and the
Nazis would have been thrown into battle against them, and the SA might well
have seized power in the general confusion. There were legal doubts whether
a mere caretaker government would be justified in offering resistance at
all. Nor did it make sense to call a general strike with six million men
unemployed. Instead the Socialists turned to the Supreme Court and sought an
injunction against Papen. "I have been a democrat for forty years and I am
not going to become a condottiere now" remarked Minister-president Braun, as
he rejected suggestions that he lead the resistance to Papen. An
understandable attitude perhaps, in the light of the party's traditions of
non-violence, rational discussion and peaceful evolution.
But whatever may be said for or against the decision of Braun and Severing
and their trade-union colleagues, one thing is quite certain. The cause of
democracy suffered a mortal blow when the Prussian government capitulated
without a struggle. Papen followed up the coup d'état with a thorough purge
of the Prussian civil service. Many loyal republican officials were retired
and the Land completely integrated with the Reich.
III. The Reichstag Elections of 1932
The Prussian coup d'état pleased the right wing, but it did not enable Papen
to woo nationalist support away from Hitler at the elections on July 31,
1932. The Populists lost over one million votes, the German nationalists
nearly 300,000, whereas the Nazi vote actually showed a slight increase on
that of the presidential election. With 13,745,000 votes the Nazis held 230
seats in the Reichstag. As leader of what was by far the largest party,
Hitler had a constitutional right to try and form a government. Schleicher
and Papen agreed that he must come into their cabinet. The difficulty was
Hitler, who was in a thoroughly intransigent mood, confident (as he had
every reason to be) of ultimate victory in the near future. Called to the
palace for consultations, he bluntly demanded full powers for his party.
The president was unimpressed by "the Bohemian corporal," refused to offer
him more than inclusion in a presidential cabinet and warned him to exercise
more control over lawless elements in the Nazi party - shortly after the
election Papen had been obliged to impose the death penalty for political
murders and to set up special courts to deal with political offences. Hitler
rejected Hindenburg's offer out of hand, but as he had no intention of
seizing power, despite much wild talk, the political deadlock was complete.
When the Reichstag met in September 1932 Papen, well aware that he had no
hope of success, promptly dissolved it, but not before Goering, newly
elected Reichstag president, had humiliated him by allowing the deputies to
carry a motion of no confidence in the Papen government by 512 votes to 42,
a sufficient comment on Papen's unpopularity in the Reichstag and in the
country as a whole.
The election on November 6, 1932 did not resolve the deadlock. But it
revealed a significant fall in the Nazi vote. This time they polled only
11,730,000 votes - a loss of two millions - and returned with 196 seats. The
decline, which was confirmed at subsequent Land elections, was due at least
in part tot he fact that Papen's withdrawal from the Disarmament conference,
until Germany was conceded equality in armaments, had impressed nationalist
opinion - for the first time since 1924 the German nationalists increased
their vote by almost 800,000 and returned with fifty-two instead of
thirty-seven seats.
This time Hitler was desperately short of funds and fighting hard for every
vote. Some of the more restless supporters were undoubtedly disillusioned by
the leader's failure to seize power in August and drifted over to the
extreme left - this was partly the reason why the Communist vote increased
by 700,000 to a total of nearly six millions, giving them 100 seats in the
Reichstag. Some middle-class supporters were probably scared away by
Hitler's vain attempts to capture the working-class vote. The Nazis reviled
the Papen cabinet as "a class government of reactionaries" and actually
collaborated with the Communists during the Berlin transport strike which
paralyzed the great city in early November.
What Papen might have made of this changing political situation will never
be known, for in November he fell victim to another Schleicher intrigue. As
Papen had no support in the Reichstag, apart from nationalists and
Populists, he tendered his resignation, a purely tactical maneuver, for he
assumed that Hitler would not be able to form a government and that
Hindenburg would then reinstate his old friend in office. As expected,
Hitler still insisted on plenary powers which the president refused to give
him. So Papen re-emerged from the wings, this time with a new plan. he
proposed to declare martial law, dissolve the Reichstag, postpone elections
and rule by decree until the constitution had been amended along
authoritarian lines and the reflationary program given time to work.
Hindenburg was willing enough to support Papen in this but Schleicher was
not. He believed that he could divide the Nazi party and cut off a section
of some sixty deputies led by the left-wing National Socialist Gregor
Strasser. With their support and the backing of sympathetic trade-union
elements in the Socialist and Center parties, where he had been taking
soundings, Schleicher hoped to build a Reichstag majority for a progressive
social program within the framework of the constitution. While Hindenburg
hesitated, Schleicher played an ace. He informed the cabinet that Papen's
policy would lead to civil war, a general strike and probably a Polish
invasion. To defend Germany against several perils simultaneously was simply
beyond the Reichswehr's capacity. When Papen now tried to have Schleicher
dismissed, Hindenburg refused and with tears rolling down his cheeks allowed
"little Franz" to depart.
IV. Schleicher Becomes Chancellor
On December 2, 1932 Schleicher became German chancellor, rather reluctantly,
as he would have much preferred to continue his intrigues behind cover.
Nothing went right for him in office. It was soon apparent that he had
grossly over-estimated his ability to divide the Nazis. Strasser was easily
outmaneuvered by Hitler, who reasserted his control over the party and
nipped signs of rebellion in the bud. Then Schleicher approached the left
with a program of public works, price-fixing, restoration of wage- and
relief-cuts, and land resettlement in East Prussia, measures which naturally
turned the right wing against him. But he could not overcome the mistrust of
Socialists and Centrists and had finally to return tot he presidential
palace to take up where Papen left off. Admitting that he could not obtain a
majority in the Reichstag, Schleicher proposed to dissolve it, declare a
state of emergency, ban the Nazis and Communists and postpone elections
indefinitely.
The role of industry in the winter of 1932-3 in ousting Schleicher and
helping Hitler to power has been the subject of much controversy. In the
boom years German industry had been uninterested in the Nazis. What support
Hitler received before 1932 came from mavericks such as Fritz Thyssen and
Emil Kirdorf. Industry was deeply suspicious of the anti-capitalist veneer
of Nazism. In October 1930 just after their spectacular electoral victory
the newly arrived Nazi deputies introduced a bill to nationalize banks and
control interest rates which Hitler obliged them to withdraw. Over the next
two years as the crisis deepened Hitler - who had no interest whatsoever in
socialism - redoubled his efforts to win industrial support but without
success. Industrialists preferred Brüning and Papen to Hitler. Consequently,
far from being in the "pocket of big business," the Nazis were desperately
short of funds from June 1932 to January 1933, as Goebbels lamented in his
diary.
Certainly some (but not all) leading figures in the cartelized coal and
steel industries, which were in dire trouble, sympathized with the Nazis.
for the latter promised to destroy parliamentary government, smash the trade
unions (ensuring that wage-levels remained low) and dismantle the welfare
system (lowering the employers' social contributions). Possibly Schleicher's
willingness to cooperate with the trade unions, introduce labor legislation
and public works program putting money in the hands of municipalities not
big business worried industrialists. But this turned them not to Hitler but
back to Papen. Recent research suggests that although much of industry was
ready enough to tolerate a Hitler cabinet and had little love for Weimar,
nevertheless, heavy industry exerted only marginal influence on Hitler's
appointment.
More important in this deadlocked political situation caused by the
Reichstag's unwillingness to assume responsibility and by the unwillingness
of both Nazis and Communists to seize power was the influence exerted by the
president's political advisers. "Little Franz" was working assiduously to
encompass Schleicher's downfall. Hugenberg's decision to support a Hitler
cabinet was equally crucial. When Hitler, worried by signs of disaffection
in his own ranks, decided to accept office in a Nationalist-Nazi cabinet
provided he became chancellor the intrigue moved forward. Papen, a frequent
and welcome visitor to Hindenburg's house, persuaded the old man that a
viable alternative to Schleicher now existed. The Nazis and Nationalists
would have a reasonable chance of obtaining a majority in the Reichstag. And
the fact that Hitler seemed prepared to share power and had broken with the
"left wing" Nazi Otto Strasser reassured Hindenburg. On top of Papen's
promptings came pressure from landowners alarmed by the plans of the
"socialist general."
The Landbund went into action accusing Schleicher, like Brüning, of
"agrarian bolshevism," a serious charge in Hindenburg's mind. Disturbing
rumor were circulating that the budget committee of the Reichstag had
uncovered evidence of misuse of public money given to inefficient landowners
under the Osthilfe. It was even alleged that relatives of the president were
implicated, although whether this influenced Oskar von Hindenburg's decision
to press Hitler's candidature on his father is uncertain. The Reichswehr
inclined to Hitler's side. General von Hammerstein, the commander-in-chief,
thought Hitler preferable to another Papen government whilst General von
Blomberg, commander in East Prussia and the soldier earmarked for minister
of defense in the new cabinet, reflected the views of younger officers in
his enthusiastic advocacy oft he Nazi cause.
Whatever the decisive factor may have been, the old man determined to be rid
of Schleicher. So when the general requested emergency powers at the end of
January, Hindenburg turned him down. had not the chancellor argued seven
weeks before that a military dictatorship meant civil war? There was nothing
left for Schleicher but resignation on January 28, 1933.
V. Hitler's Accession
On January 30, 1933 Hindenburg received Hitler in audience and appointed him
chancellor. That night and into the early morning Hitler stood on the
chancellery balcony in salute as a huge torchlight procession of 100,000
excited supporters marched past in triumph, singing the Horst Wessel song.
This was a great hour for the rank and file. All the efforts of a handful of
reactionary advisers in the presidential palace had failed to keep the
leader from power. At last the long-awaited "National Revolution" would
begin.
In fact Hitler did not stand alone. A hundred meters away a slightly
bewildered Hindenburg stood at an open window oft he presidential palace as
the precession passed. It was a timely reminder that Hitler had not seized
power. He had come to office by a sordid backstairs intrigue and with the
president's consent. he was chancellor, but in a government of "national
concentration," surrounded by such orthodox reactionaries as Hugenburg and
Seldte of the Stahlhelm. There were in fact only two Nazis in the cabinet,
Frick, minister of the interior, and Goering, minister without portfolio and
Prussian minister of the interior. Papen, vice-chancellor in the new
cabinet, was elated by the success of his intrigue, believing that he had
taken Hitler prisoner and succeeded where Brüning and Schleicher failed. "In
two months we'll have pushed Hitler into a corner so hard that he'll be
squeaking," Papen boasted to a friend.