Korea: Stalin's War?

During the War, Truman and US Intelligence believed that Stalin lay behind the war, and that he was ‘probing’ for an American weakness he could exploit.  At the end of the Cold War, Soviet archives were opened – including, notably, a 1966 document which provided a Soviet summary of the war from their PoV – which have allowed historians to construct a truer image of Soviet actions and intentions. 

Before the War

Soviet forces entered Korea in August 1945, advancing to the 38th Parallel as agreed with the US, Colonel-General Terentii Shtykov established a Soviet Civil Administration in northern Korea. 

In February 1946, Shtykov installed Kim Il Sung as head of a Communist North Korean government; Soviet military advisers helped build the North Korean People's Army and Korean People's Air Force. 

In Dec 1946 Shtykov designed and organised elections and, with Stalin, wrote the North Korean constitution.  Although the North Koreans had no say in this process, the new government did allow a degree of independence, particularly at local level, where the ‘People’s Committees’ were integrated into the new communist system.  North Korea at this time is often represented as a ‘puppet state’, where Stalin pulled the strings, but it is clear that – although Stalin had ‘the final word’, North Korea was proactive, particularly in seeking to attack the South. 

IIn Dec 1948 the Soviet Army withdrew, but Shtykov remained as ambassador, but neither was he a mere cypher – he supported Kim Il Sung’s proposals, and sought to influence Stalin’s decision. 

Stalin, in turn, also involved Mao Zedong and the People’s Republic of China (PRC).  North Korean historians still insist that it was the South Koreans who started the War, but the archives reveal that a four-way conversation – Kim/ Shtykov/ Mao/ Stalin – had been discussing invasion for the past year.  Large-scale deliveries of Soviet materiel – tanks, artillery, planes etc.  – started arriving in North Korea from September 1949. 

HOWEVER, they also reveal that – far from Stalin initiating the War – it was Kim who was pressing for a military intervention and Stalin who continually refused permission/support for an attack … the reason given being that there was too much danger of it provoking a world war with America.  In October 1949 Shtykov was formally reprimanded for recommending to the government of North Korea that they carry out operations against South Korea without first getting Moscow’s approval. 

The 1966 document summarises:

"During this period, Kim Il Sung and other Korean leaders were firmly determined to unify the country by military means… calculating that the USA would not enter a war over South Korea, Kim Il Sung persistently pressed for agreement from Stalin and Mao Zedong to reunify the country by military means (Telegrams 4-51, 233, 1950). 

"Stalin at first treated the persistent appeals of Kim Il Sung with reserve…"

Top Secret Report for the Soviet leadership, On the Korean War, 1950-53, and the Armistice Negotiations (1966)

In 1992, a retired Soviet General stated that Kim made three arguments that changed Stalin’s mind: he promised that a surprise attack would win the war in three days; that the communists and guerrillas in the South would rise up to help; and that Acheson’s Press Club speech (12 Jan 1950) had eased fears of US intervention. 

Thus, only in January 1950 did Stalin offer to give his approval (in return for 25,000 tons of lead a year) … but even then he stressed that "the matter should be organised so that there will not be a great risk", and he did not give final approval until April.  Stalin gave Kim permission to invade the South under the condition that Mao would agree to send reinforcements if needed, and he made it clear that Soviet forces would not openly engage in combat, to avoid a direct war with the US. 

During the War

Soviet military advisers were seminal in the preparation of the NKPA invasion plans, and – especially Shtykov – remained influential throughout the War. 

During the War, the Soviets supplied by far the greatest proportion of the modern materiel, notably a sub-machine gun (nicknamed the ‘burp gun’), T-34 tanks, Bazookas and MiG-15 planes. 

It is also clear that Soviet personnel went to Korea.  The USSR sent a team of 20 Soviet doctors.  The most notable contribution came in 1951-53 after the Chinese invasion when, despairing of the Chinese and NKPA airforce, dispatched two divisions of the 64th Fighter Corps (about 2,000 men in total).  Anti-aircraft gunners, and searchlight and technical units also served in Korea. 

A note from the Soviet Chief of Staff in December 1951 reported that, in the previous year, 30 pilots and 29 artillery men had been killed and 53 wounded, and 63 planes lost – whilst one suspects these numbers had been under-reported to avoid Stalin’s wrath, it proves that Stalin did send Soviet soldiers into Korea. 

Having said that, however:

a.  Materiel excepted, Soviet active involvement in the War was tiny compared to that of China. 

b.  Stalin at first PULLED OUT his Soviet military advisers in Jun 1950 because: "they might be taken prisoner; we don’t want there to be evidence for accusing us of taking part.  It’s Kim Il Sung’s affair.", and he refused Kim’s request to supply naval personnel, ships or landing craft because "it gives grounds for interference". 

c.  Even when the NPKA were being driven back in September 1950, Stalin refused Kim’s (frequent and urgent) appeals for military assistance – instead, it was Stalin who suggested (1 Oct) that an army of Chinese ‘people’s volunteers’ might be the best way to help without provoking a world war, and he contacted Mao to ask him to supply such. 

d.  In September and October 1950, when the NKPA were being driven back by the US 8th Army, Stalin – writing under the pseudonym ‘Fyn Si’ – did send two long letters giving military advice to Kim Il Sung.  Stalin, of course, had directed Soviet military victory during WWII, but "in this case his instructions are so elementary that they appear to be more an expression of anger and anxiety than a meaningful attempt to exercise military leadership" (Weatherby, 1993). 

Above, what comes across from the documents is the intense desire of Stalin to avoid risk, to keep Soviet participation secret … to avoid provoking a nuclear war.  The sending of Soviet pilots to Korea was made a state secret, and Soviet pilots who flew in the War wore Chinese uniforms, were forbidden to speak in Russian over the radio, and were forbidden to fly over enemy-held territory so that they could not be taken prisoner if shot down; indeed, they were so secret that some of them were shot down by North Korean planes by mistake. 

Conclusion

There is no doubt that Kim Il Sung – and even Mao Zedong – were subordinate to Stalin in the chain of decision-making.  Kim’s letters are all-but-grovelling:

"I ask that you accept the expression of deepest respect and gratitude for the invaluable assistance which you, Comrade Stalin, continually render to our people in their struggle for independence.  Being confident of your desire to help the Korean people rid themselves of the American imperialists, I am obliged to appeal to you with a request to… [etc.]

Hand-written letter, Kim Il Sung to Stalin, 8 July 1950. 

"In the name of the Labor Party of Korea we bring to you – liberator of the Korean people and leader of the working people of the whole world – deepest gratitude for the assistance and aid which you continually render to our people, who are fighting….  [etc.]

Kim Il Sung to Stalin, 29 Sept 1950. 

However, although Stalin seems to have been well-disposed to their proposals, it is clear that the initiative came from Kim, and that Stalin – even when he acceded to Kim’s requests – was anxious to keep the USSR’s name out of it and, as far as possible, to limit any help to materiel.