China Enters the War

After August 1950, the Korean War resembled one of those 'Newton's Cradle' executive desk toys, with the battlefront swinging up and down the Korean peninsula.

THE NKPA ARE DEFEATED

In September 1950 an amphibious assault flotilla left Pusan and landed at Inchon (the port of Seoul). Historians are agreed that it was both “strategically brilliant” and “a huge gamble”.

The USSR had warned Kim Il Sung of the danger of a US landing at Inchon, but Kim focussed on capturing Pusan.

• On 10 September, the USAF dropped napalm bombs to “burn out” a way for US troops to land.

• On 15 Sep, US troops landed, and immediately secured Seoul’s airfield; by 22 Sep the US had flown in 6,600 vehicles, 25,000 tons of gasoline and 54,000 troops.

• On 28 Sep, Seoul was finally liberated, and the US force headed inland.

Meanwhile, to the south, the US 8th Army had broken out of the Pusan Perimeter, and were advancing north. Both China and the USSR sent urgent messages to Kim to withdraw his army from Pusan, but it was too late; the NKPA were trapped. US General Walker issued the order: “Pursue and destroy the enemy”.

Pak Ki-song, an NKPA political intelligence chief, later claimed that the NKPA had withdrawn in good order, tempting the UN forces to over-extend and drawing them into a trap. Even if that is true (and most historians say that the NKPA disintegrated), it was a terrible defeat. The NKPA lost 135,000 soldiers taken prisoner, 200,000 casualties, all its tanks and heavy weapons, whole train-loads of supplies. The NKPA army that re-grouped in the ‘Iron Triangle’ south of Pyongyang was reduced to 30,000 at most.

WHY did the UN defeat the NKPA?

1. A simple matter of numbers. The Allies had more troops (385,000) – almost the entire US military of America and Japan was in Korea – five times as many tanks, superior artillery, excellent air and naval reconnaissance, and control of the air and sea. The Inchon landing involved 270 ships and the USAF reduced Inchon to rubble.

2. Only 2,000 poorly-trained troops defended Inchon; the USSR had sent naval mines, but Kim had not used them to protect the harbour.

3. Bruce Cumings attributes the success at Inchon to the genius of Admiral Arthur Struble, the US Navy’s amphibious expert.

4. Kim had concentrated most of his army (98,000 men and women soldiers) on the Pusan perimeter. The Inchon operation flanked the NPKA and trapped them.

5. The NKPA invasion had been planned as a 50-day operation; by September, the soldiers were tired and – since the USAF had cut their supply lines – hungry.

THE UN INVADES NORTH KOREA

By the end of September, MacArthur had restored Syngman Rhee as President of South Korea, and his troops had reached the 38th Parallel. On 1 October he demanded the NKPA’s unconditional surrender.

Truman wanted him to remain at the 38th Parallel – he was worried that China would enter the war – but almost everybody else in Washington saw the chance to ‘roll back’ communism. On 15 October, Truman met MacArthur at Wake Island in the middle of the Pacific. MacArthur – who had his own intelligence network, FECOM – assured him that China would not enter the war. Truman was pacified.

To be fair to Truman, China had threatened to intervene if UN forces crossed the 38th parallel. To be fair to MacArthur, UN forces were already well into North Korea and China seemed to have done nothing.

On 19 October, the US 8th Army captured Pyongyang, and UN forces advanced north almost unimpeded. On 24 October, the ROK 6th Division reached the Yalu River, the border with China, with US and Australian forces not far behind.

WHY did the UN invade North Korea?

1. To destroy NKPA military capacity in North Korea.

2. By the end of October the NKPA were offering no opposition and appeared totally defeated.

3. The attitude in Washington had changed; in April 1950, the American National Security Council issued a report (NSC68) recommending that America abandon 'containment' and start 'rolling back' communism. In September NSC81 authorised MacArthur to go into North Korea as long as it dd not bring China into the war.

4. MacArthur – who had immense personal prestige – assured Truman that China would not enter the war; China did not appear to be mobilising.

5. Many Americans felt a need to punish the aggressor for the war, and the deaths and atrocities; a return to the status quo was not enough.

6. The UN supported the invasion because it would unify Korea, which had been its goal all along.

7. Syngman Rhee was pushing hard for full unification; ROK forces spearheaded the advance.

THE CHINESE CAMPAIGNS

Assuring Truman and the troops that the war would be over by Christmas, MacArthur organised the conquest of North Korea as a two-pronged ‘pincer’ movement – the ROK (obeying Rhee’s orders to advance as quickly as possible) would join X Corps (under his direct command) advancing up the east coast/ the 8th Army would advance up the west of the country. In between the two prongs were a range of mountains and difficult terrain. Their progress was reported in the newspapers.

Progress was almost uncontested; the only worry was whether the Chinese might intervene … but daily reconnaissance spotted no sign of an army.

In fact, however, the Chinese ‘People’s Volunteer Army’ had started crossing the Yahu on the 13 October. As early as August 1950 Mao Zedong had realised he would have to intervene “in the name of a volunteer army”, and on 1 September he warned that China would not tolerate an invasion of North Korea.

WHY did the Chinese intervene?

1. The Chinese were fanatical communists, fresh from winning their civil war, and looking for an opportunity to extend the revolution.

2. The Chinese were proud nationalists, keen to avenge centuries of abuse under imperialist foreigners.

3. By calling itself the ‘People’s Volunteer Army’, the Chinese Army lessened the chance of a direct war with America.

4. From 15 September the North Koreans were begging China to send an army to help them.

5. Mao felt obliged to help “the Korean people who have stood on our side during the past decades.”

6. Mao did not want the United States, or a Korea led by Syngman Rhee, directly on China's border.

7. Standing up for North Korea would increase China’s prestige in the communist bloc.

By 19th October there were 200,000 Chinese troops gathered unnoticed in the mountains along the flanks of both advancing UN armies, and on 25 October they launched their First Phase Offensive. For a fortnight they mauled the UN troops advancing up the west coast. Then they disappeared back into the mountains. The UN forces paused, regrouped and then, in late November, resumed their advance.

The Chinese had used the pause to bring their strength up to 380,000. On 25 November they launched their Second Offensive. Fighting in temperatures down to -22°C, they drove back the UN forces. The Second Offensive was followed by a Third, Fourth and Fifth. Seoul fell on 4 January 1951. By the end of January 1951, the PVA had reconquered two-thirds of the peninsula.

The US was deeply shocked. MacArthur considered dropping nuclear bombs in North Korea, to break PVA supply lines.

WHY were the Chinese able to drive back the UN troops?

1. MacArthur was over-confident, and ignored warnings from the men on the ground.

2. Advancing rapidly, both columns were strung out along narrow dirt roads with over-stretched supply lines; the mountains prevented ANY communication between the two arms.

3. The Chinese lured the UN forces into a trap, and took them by surprise.

4. UN reconnaissance failed to notice the massive build-up of PVA troops, who marched through the mountains at night, on foot, and then hid themselves & equipment and bivouacked during the day. They deliberately misinformed their illiterate troops – UN forces captured a hundred Chinese soldiers, but their stories were so contradictory that FECOM concluded that there was no Chinese Army in Korea.

5. The PVA were hardened veterans of a forty-year guerrilla war. They were highly disciplined, fit and prepared to die. Their leaders were highly trained graduates of military academies.

6. Chinese infantry had no heavy weaponry; they carried their weapons with them, and struck by surprise, often at night, with bugles and terrifying ‘human wave’ attacks.

7. The Chinese tactic was to allow the US infantry to advance into a V-shaped trap, then close the arms of the V behind them to cut them off from support … knowing that the US soldiers were “weak, afraid to die” and would abandon everything and flee.

8. The weather froze the US equipment, and favoured the Chinese, used to such winters.

Source A

Conclusions of Battle Experience

“The coordinated action of mortars and tanks is an important factor... Their artillery is very active... Aircraft strafing and bombing of our transportation have become a great hazard to us... Their rate of infantry fire is great.

Cut off from the rear, they abandon all their heavy weapons... Their infantrymen are weak, afraid to die, and have no courage to attack or defend. They depend on their planes, tanks, artillery... They are not familiar with night fighting or hand-to-hand combat.

If defeated, they have no orderly formation... they become dazed and completely demoralized. They are afraid when the rear is cut off. When transportation comes to a standstill, the infantry loses the will to fight.”

A pamphlet distributed to PVA officers.

Source B

This German cartoon of July 1950 shows China and the USA slogging it out in Korea, and the leaders of West and East Germany (which had similarly been divided after WWII) worrying: "Oh dear – is this the dress rehearsal!?"

Consider:

1. What evidence is there that the Korean war was:
a. an American war against communism;
b. a UN operation against international aggression.

2. Earlier in this Unit, you may have decided that the Korean War was a 'Korean Civil War', not a 'Cold War conflict'. Do you still think so?

3. How great a threat to world peace was the Korean War?

AQA-style Questions

Spotted an error on this page? Broken link? Anything missing? Let me know.