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The controversy over how much
Germany is to be blamed for the outbreak of World War One has been brewing
for half a century. Today, we still cannot wholly resolve that question; and
I doubt that it will ever be answered to everyone's satisfaction. But we can
in the light of recent research, put the problem into somewhat more
enlightening focus.
The fundamental error of German policy-makers seems to have been that they
miscalculated the chances of Britain remaining neutral. This is the
underlying assumption in this this whole affair.
Below the placid calm that prevailed before the murder of the Austrian
archduke in Sarajevo, there was a growing feeling throughout Europe that the
great world war was all but inevitable. The Germans felt themselves to be
encircled and gradually outmaneuvered by the growing military strength of
Russia and France. In this environment the earlier talk of preventive war
attained new urgency. The chief of the German General Staff, Moltke, even
asked the Foreign Secretary to precipitate a preventive war. Although Jagow
refused, he admitted that the idea influenced him throughout the month of
crisis that followed the Sarajevo assassination. There was also a feeling
among Germany's conservative upper and middle-class rulers that a war would
resolve the social conflict between the liberal and socialist lower classes
and the conservative-aristocratic ruling groups.
The murder of Franz Ferdinand on June 28, 1914, produced both consternation
and relief. Among the mourners in Vienna one could detect some sense:of
satisfaction that the proponent of a federal reorganization of the
Austro-Hungarian Empire had vanished. Others, primarily Baron Conrad von
Hötzendorff, the Austro-Hungarian chief of staff, saw a golden opportunity
to settle accounts with Serbia once and for all, since the latter bad long
supported the agitation for greater freedom for the Slav minority within the
empire. Berchtold, the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister and Tisza, the
Hungarian Prime Minister counseled caution, as did the German ambassador in
Vienna. However, the old Austrian emperor Franz Joseph backed Conrad, and
the German emperor decided that accounts should be settled with Serbia-it
was "now or never" in his words'
Austria could not risk a move against Serbia without German support since
Serbia was backed by Russia. Vienna sent Count Hoyos to Berlin on July 5 to
question German intentions and returned with a firm promise from William
that Austria-Hungary could "count on Germany's full support,'' even in the
case of "grave European complications." William even suggested that Vienna
march immediately. This blank check was based on the assumption that Russia
and France were not yet strong enough to risk a general war.
Constitutionally William had to consult the Chancellor be fore making such a
decision. But he called in Bethmann-Hollweg only after the blank check had
been signed. But the latter agreed readily and the German military leaders,
including the chief of staff, Helmuth von Moltke, all assured the Kaiser
that they were ready if war should come. The emperor then went off on a
North sea cruise, assuring a close industrial friend that he was not
''falling out'' this time. The reference was to the reproach of the military
in the Moroccan crisis of 1911 when the emperor had backed away from
military confrontation. The Pan-German League had threatened him with
deposition at that time. Thus a childishly defiant emperor prepared the way
for Conrad's vengeful design to punish Serbia.
In the Austro-Hungarian Ministerial Council of July 7 only Count Tisza
objected to an attack of Serbia. Berchtold advised that an ultimatum should
be sent to Belgrade first in order to put Serbia in the wrong and keep
Rumania and Britain neutral. Tisza was won over by the ultimatum idea and
the German ambassador in London was instructed to mobilize British opinion
against Serbia without revealing that Germany was egging Austria on to war.
Germany was eager to localize the conflict but not to stop it.
Germany put severe pressure on Austria to act quickly because she feared
that hesitation would be interpreted as weakness and thus lessen Austria's
importance as a German ally. Furthermore, it was assumed in Berlin that
England would certainly not rim a major war just to settle a local squabble
in the Balkans. Germany also pressured Vienna to make the ultimatum note so
strong as to be unacceptable by Serbia. The emperor here too took the lead
and his lieutenants followed. The emperor only regretted that the ultimatum
could not be sent before July 25. It was timed for that day because the
French president Poincaré would be returning from a visit to Russia then and
an immediate Franco-Russian reply would thus be postponed.
On July 18 British Foreign Minister Lord Grey told the German ambassador in
London that England would never back an aggressor, which led the Germans to
put even greater pressure on Vienna to make the ultimatum stronger. In fact,
it is clear that throughout the period from July 4 to July 18 German policy
was consistently militant, much more so than Austria-Hungary. Berlin was
bound and determined to split the Entente and bring about a regrouping of
European powers favorable to Germany. Berlin was bound and determined to
split the Entente and bring about a regrouping of European powers favorable
to Germany. And this was to be done without the intervention of Great
Britain.
After considerable argument the Austro-Hungarian Ministerial Council finally
decided on the wording of the ultimatum with Berlin's constant consultation
and full approval. The ultimatum was to be delivered on the 23rd of July
rather than the 25th, Berlin again making sure that Poincaré and Viviani,
French foreign minister, had actually left St. Petersburg by that time. All
of this was secret, of course, and publican Berlin intended to act surprised
at the severity of the wording when the missive reached Belgrade. But Vienna
was to be supported by Berlin with the great powers in any case.
Thus Russia, France and England were to be pressured to keep the controversy
and expected military conflict localized in the Balkans. Despite the fact
that Grey expressed doubt the conflict could remain local, Germany insisted
on believing that Grey would change his mind. However, Germany did not have
the same opinion about Russian reaction and was making preparation to deal
with that.
The publication of the ultimatum shocked Europe and generated the suspicion
that Germany had a hand in it, which the latter denied, but which was true,
as we have seen. Grey made an offer of mediation and suggested that Russia
influence Serbia and Germany Austro-Hungary to reduce tension, and that
Vienna withdraw the clearly impossible demands. But Berlin made only a show
of backing the mediation and consistently undermined all British mediation
attempts between July 24 and the outbreak of the war.
Grey's request for an extension of the 48 hour time limit was passed on to
Vienna by Berlin only after the hour had passed and with the subtle
suggestion that it be rejected. The same procedure was used with other Grey
initiatives. Grey at one point indicated that he distinguished between an
Austro-Serbian conflict and an Austro-Russian conflict and Germany eagerly
pounced on this idea to keep the line to London open. This was done by
publically agreeing to four-power mediation. But Vienna's suggestion that
the existing power relationships in the Balkans could be maintained was
furiously rejected by Germany. Austria-Hungary would have to become
predominant there at the expense of Russia.
Grey and King George V then made another proposal. This time for a
conference of ambassadors, including Italy, designed to put great power
pressure on Serbia to give Austria full satisfaction. But Berlin rejected it
on the excuse that it could not bring Austria's dealing with Serbia before a
European tribunal and urged Vienna to take the same line. Meanwhile Moltke
drafted a demand to Belgium for passage of German troops trough that neutral
country, thereby clearly indicating that Germany expected a general war to
come. Grey made a final plea on the 27th that urged Germany to influence
Austria to accept the Serbian reply, implying that only in this case could
London ask for moderation in St. Petersburg. Grey clearly put the onus on
Berlin to prevent a general war, suggesting that Germany could stop
Austria's foolhardy policy if she wanted to. Other nations made similar
pleas.
All these pacific efforts fell on deaf ears in Berlin. Instead the latter
urged Berchtold to present a declaration war on Serbia before Franz Joseph
for signature. This was done on July 27 with the intent that it be sent to
Belgrade no latter than the 29th in order to prevent any more mediating
interventions. So, while Grey and Sazonov, the Russian foreign minister,
were playing for time, Germany was urging Austria to act quickly. This was
the situation throughout the July crisis, Germany wanting to face the world
with a fait accompli, while making it look, particularly to England, that
she was trying to rein in Austrian militancy. To do this Bethmann-Hollweg
and the military leaders had to deceive the German emperor. For the latter
was willing to accept Serbia's reply and the final mediation proposal of
Lord Grey. But certain facts were withheld from him and Bethmann and the
military seemed to be prepared now for a general war if localization failed.
But the general war was to be fought under favorable conditions, which meant
that Russia must be made to take the blame and England must be kept neutral.
Bethmann thought he had found the key to this in localization. He assured
Russia that Austria was not interested in any territorial extensions in
Serbia and hence Russia would be responsible for the maintenance of pace in
Europe. Germany's attitude had to be calm. Only if she were attacked could
she count on British neutrality and domestic support from the Social
Democrats.
At 11:00 AM on July 28 Austria presented her declaration of war on Serbia.
The German Emperor had urged a "halt in Belgrade" for the Austrian armies,
but this message was not delivered to Vienna until the afternoon, when it
was too late according to Berchtold. At the same time tension arose between
Vienna and Berlin since Germany suddenly realized that Austro-Hungary could
not begin hostilities in practice until August 12.
This Bethmann found highly regrettable since the powers would thus have time
to make additional proposals of mediation and manage to put the onus of
hostilities on Germany, if she showed continued reserve towards mediation.
Even the German people might get the wrong idea about who was responsible
for a world war. A successful war on three fronts against Serbia, Russia and
France could not be initiated under these auspices. It was absolutely
mandatory that all the blame for an extension of the conflict be placed on
Russia. This was Bethmann's unwavering line, that the conflict must be
localized and if that were impossible then Russia must be branded as the
aggressor in order to maintain British neutrality.
But the hope of British neutrality was an illusion, which apparently no one
realized expect the German ambassador in London, Count Lichnowsky. Despite
the latter's repeated warnings the German government continued to count
confidently on British neutrality as well as that of Italy and Rumania. With
Austria's declaration of war on July 28, the acid test of this assumption
had arrived. Conrad soon asked whether mobilization was to be against Serbia
only or Russia as well.
The automatic operation of the war machine now began to show itself in
Germany too. Moltke explained to Bethmann the inevitable connection between
mobilization and alliance which must now led to a world war. He "emphasized
particularly the causal nexus linking Austria's intervention against Serbia
via Russian partial mobilization to Austrian, Russian and German general
mobilization, which would then inevitably draw in France, the first
objective of German military strategy." Russia called for partial
mobilization against Austria when the latter mobilized against Serbia and
Bethmann was now pressured by Moltke and Conrad to respond. But he waited
for Russia to declare general mobilization in order to maintain British
non-involvement.
The German generals were bound by the Kaiser's order to halt at Belgrade,
but they ignored that and sent a request to the German minister in Brussels
to allow the passage of German troops through Belgium. This happened on July
29, when Bethmann Hollweg also had a remarkable conversation with the
British ambassador in Berlin. He tried to pin Britain down on a neutrality
agreement by promising not to seek French territory after a victorious war.
He also betrayed Germany's intention of violating Belgium territory. Grey
called this an "infamous" offer and the British government now knew for
certain that Germany had deiced on a general war. This was the end of
Germany's policy of localization and it is surprising that Bethmann was
wholly unprepared for Britain's response to his offer.
Grey repeated his proposal of four-power mediation but stated in
unmistakable terms that Britain would come to the aid of France if she were
attacked. This upset the entire German applecart. The hope of British
neutrality if Russia were shown to be the aggressor turned out to be a
pipedream. Bethmann was shattered,but put immediate pressure on Vienna to
accept mediation and negotiate with Russia. But Vienna was too deeply
involved to change now and Bethmann did not really have a change of heart,
because he could have stopped the war by refusing support for Austria. But
this he did not do. In fact he continued to try to put the blame on Russia.
He gave up his guest for British neutrality and shifted his concern to
possible domestic opposition from the Social Democrats. This could only be
avoided if Russia were the aggressor.
When Berlin received news that Russia had declared partial mobilization
against Austria, the Kaiser was unhappy. At the same time there came a
report from the German naval attache in London that the British fleet would
mount an instant and immediate attack on Germany at sea if it came to war
with France. This sent Kaiser Wilhelm into hysteria. He denounced
"perfidious Albion," "that filthy cur, Grey," and ''that filthy nation of
grocers." Now England was the real war criminal since Russia could not fight
without English support. He even castigated Bethmann for thinking that an
arrangement could have been made to keep England neutral. The Kaiser's anger
gave vent to grandiose plans of instigating revolution in the Islamic world
against Britain. The result of this was that Germany made an alliance with
Turkey (on August 12) and two German cruisers were dispatched to
Constantinople. Turkey was to become the base for an anti-British
revolution. Revolutionary embers were also to be kindled in other parts of
the world as well as in Eastern Europe against Russia.
There was some confusion on the 3Oth whether Russian mobilization was
partial or general and only general mobilization, meaning against Germany as
well as Austria, was considered sufficient reason to caste Russia as the
aggressor. When general Russian mobilization was confirmed on July 31, the
German emperor proclaimed "a state of imminent threat of war" and said that
"they are pressing the sword into our hands." So Bethmann was successful in
this gambit of making the German people believe they were attacked and in
defusing opposition from the Social Democrats. This was also the reason why
Germany gave Russia a 12 hour ultimatum to stop mobilization and postponed
her own mobilization until August left.
At the very last minute, on August left, after the general mobilization
Order had been signed there came an offer from Britain to guarantee French
neutrality. The Kaiser eagerly accepted but the military informed him that
nothing could be changed for technical reasons, since German patrols were
already inside the borders of Luxembourg. There were other reports that
England was willing to stay out even if France and Russia were in, but
nothing materialized. German hatred of England thereafter knew few bounds.
The German declaration of war on Russia on August left, and on France two
days later overshadowed everything else. Austria Hungary did not follow suit
until a week later and the tsar was still talking about peace despite
mobilization. But in the eyes of the world the German declarations of war
were the key factors.
So, who was guilty? Probably all the leaders of the major powers share some
element of blame. But there is little doubt where the greatest share of
responsibility must fall. "As Germany willed and coveted the Austro-Serbian
war and, in her confidence in her military superiority, deliberately faced
the risk of a conflict with Russia and France, her leaders must bear a
substantial share of the historical responsibility for the outbreak of
general war in 1914."
Shortly after the war began, during the crisis of the Marne and Galicia,
when Austrian troops were hard pressed, Vienna asked for German assistance.
When it was refused, Count Tisza reminded the Germans that the emperor and
chancellor had pressed them to take decisive action. In August 1917, during
a heated debate whether the war should be continued for the expressed German
war aims, Austro-Hungary's Foreign Minister Czernin replied angrily to his
German questioners: "It was not Austria alone that began the war then.
Germany demanded that the ultimatum to Serbia should be drawn up in those
sharp terms." In 1918 Czernin published a letter from Berchtold to Czernin
which revealed what strong efforts Germany had made to hold Austria to a
hard line, and how the Austro-German alliance might have been in danger if
Austria had given way.
There is other evidence. An Austrian politician (Josef Baernreither), not
unfriendly to Germany, wrote in his diary for December, 1914: ''The Germans
were afraid that we would refuse to go with them if the war broke out over
some question remote from us. . . . .So when the Sarajevo murder took place,
Germany seized her opportunity and made an Austrian grievance her signal for
action." In 1926 even a man like Admiral Tirpitz published a statement which
said that a determined group in the German foreign office "worked
systematically to get Austria committed inextricably, as the first step, so
as to be sure of her. The whole plan of campaign against Serbia was arranged
in advance to make a conflict inevitable." Albert Ballin, close friend of
Bethmann, wrote in 1915: "I make every allowance for a man who is heavily
incriminated, as your Excellency is, and has to bear the frightful
responsibility for having staged this war which is costing Germany
generations of splendid men and setting her back 100 years."
But this July crisis, which we have discussed here in some detail, must not
be taken in isolation. It becomes only truly significant when we view it in
the light of the "world policy" Germany pursued since the 1890's and the
subsequent aims she strove for during the war.
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